In this paper, we introduce a new learning algorithm for adaptive intrusion detection using boosting and naïve Bayesian classifier, which considers a series of classifiers and combines the votes of each individual classifier for classifying an unknown or known example. The proposed algorithm generates the probability set for each round using naïve Bayesian classifier and updates the weights of training examples based on the misclassification error rate that produced by the training examples in each round. This algorithm addresses the problem of classifying the large intrusion detection dataset, which improves the detection rates (DR) and reduces the false positives (FP) at acceptable level in intrusion detection. We tested the performance of the proposed algorithm with existing data mining algorithms by employing on the KDD99 benchmark intrusion detection dataset, and the experimental results proved that the proposed algorithm achieved high detection rates and significantly reduced the number of false positives for different types of network intrusions.
INTRODUCTION
Due to the large volumes of intrusion detection dataset, the intelligent computing society has been applied many data mining algorithms for detecting intrusions in the last decades [1] - [3] . Today's real-world intrusion detection datasets are complex, dynamic, and composed of many different attributes, which are highly susceptible to noise, missing and inconsistent data due to their typically huge size. The task of data mining and knowledge discovery from data (KDD) based intrusion detection systems (IDS) is to find the interesting hidden intrusion patterns in large intrusion detection dataset and realizing the performance optimization of detection rules. Intrusion detection system (IDS) is the combination of both hardware and software that is used to detect intrusions or attacks in computer system or network, and then notifies intrusion prevention system (IPS) or network security administrator about the intrusions. However, currently available commercial IDS are misuse based, which can only detect known intrusions with very low false positives that are already stored in the dataset, but now-a-days intruders are very intelligent and they frequently change the intrusion patterns to attack into the network. Intruders are classified into two categories like inside and outside intruders. Inside intruders are the valid user of the network and have some authority, but seek to gain additional ability to take actions without legitimate authorization. On the other side, outside intruders do not have any authorized access to the network that they attack. Ideally, IDS should have an attack detection rate of 100% along with false positive rate 0%, which is really very hard to achieve.
Today, data mining have become an indispensable tools for analyzing the large volumes of intrusion detection data to detect intrusions by finding the hidden intrusion patterns from the dataset [4] - [7] . The naïve Bayesian (NB) classifier is an efficient and well known technique for performing classification task in data mining, which is widely applied in many real world applications including intrusion detection problem [8] - [16] . The NB classifier provides an optimal way to predict the class of an unknown example whose attribute values are known, but class value is unknown by calculating prior and conditional probabilities from the training dataset. Boosting is the process of combining many classifiers to generate a single strong classifier with very low error. In this paper, we present a new learning algorithm based on boosting, and naïve Bayesian classifier for adaptive intrusion detection. The proposed algorithm first initializes the weight of training examples to 1/n, where n is the total number of examples in training dataset, and then creates a new dataset from training dataset using selection with replacement technique. After that it calculates the prior and conditional probabilities of new dataset, and classifies the training examples with these probabilities value. The weights of the training examples updated according to how they were classified. If a training example is misclassified then its weight is increased, or if correctly classified then its weight is decreased. Then the algorithm creates another new data set with the misclassification error produced by each training example from training dataset, and continues the process until all the training examples are correctly classified. To classify a new example use all the probabilities in each round (each round is considered as a classifier) and consider the class of new example with highest classifier's vote. The proposed algorithm has been successfully tested on the KDD99 benchmark network intrusion detection dataset from UCI machine learning repository, which achieved high detection rates with very low false positives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data mining for intrusion detection overview, and related works. In Section 3, we present the boosting, naïve Bayesian classifier, and the proposed learning algorithm. In Section 4, we apply the proposed algorithm to the area of intrusion detection using KDD99 benchmark network intrusion detection dataset, and compare the results with other related algorithms. Finally, Section 5 contains the conclusions with future works.
INTRUSION DETECTION
An intrusion can be defined as any set of actions that threaten the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of computational resources of a computer system or network. Intrusion detection have become a critical component of network administration as the extensive growth of the Internet and the tools for intruding and attacking networks are available now-a-days. An intrusion detection system (IDS) for a large complex network can typically generate thousands or millions of alarms per day, representing an overwhelming task for the security analysis.
Host vs. Network IDS
Initially IDS was developed for host-based computer systems. The host-based IDS (HIDS) are located in the server computers and examine the internal interfaces [17] . It detects intrusions by analyzing application logs, system calls, file-system modifications, and other host activities that related to the server computers. Context Sensitive String Evaluation (CSSE) is one of the Host-based IDS for detecting intrusions in applications with extremely low false-positives [18] . CSSE uses an instrumented execution environment (such as PHP or Java Virtual Machine) and therefore has access to all necessary contexts required to detect and more importantly prevent attacks. The context is provided by the metadata, which describes the fragments of the output expression that requires checking and examining the intercepted call to the API function. CSSE uses contextual information to check the unsafe fragments for syntactic content. Depending on the mode of CSSE it can raise an alert and prevent the execution of the dangerous content (both intrusion detection and prevention). Currently CSSE is available as research-prototype IDS for the PHP platform [19] , [20] .
With the popularization of computer networks the idea of IDS gradually shifted toward the network-based IDS. It monitors and analyzes network packets to detect intrusions in the network [21] . Snort is an open source network intrusion detection and prevention system (NIDPS) capable of performing packet logging and real-time traffic analysis of IP networks. Snort was written by Martin Roesch and is now developed by Sourcefire [22] , [23] . Snort performs protocol analysis, content searching/matching, and is commonly used to actively block a variety of attacks. Most of the current attacks happen at higher layers: transport (TCP/UDP) or application (HTTP, RPC) layers and Snort uses so-called preprocessors which perform stream reassembly and normalization of higher-level protocols. To detect an attack targeting a web server the preprocessors normalize the IP-level traffic, TCP state machine emulation and stream reassembly, HTTP-level normalization, defragmentation, and Unicode decoding.
Misuse vs. Anomaly IDS
Intrusion detection model is broadly classified into two categories: misuse-based and anomaly-based intrusion detection model.
Misuse-based IDS are also known as signature-based or patternbased IDS, which detect known intrusions based on the attacks that stored in database with very low false positives. It performs pattern matching of incoming packets and/or command sequences to the signatures of known attacks. The detection rate of misuse-based IDS is relatively low, because the attacker always tries to modify the basic attack signature in such a way that will not match the attack signature, which is already installed in the database. It can protect the computer system/network immediately upon installation, but it requires frequently signature updates to keep the signature database upto-date. Misuse-based IDS use various techniques including rule-based expert systems, model-based reasoning systems, state transition analysis, genetic algorithms, and fuzzy logic.
Anomaly-based IDS can detect known or unknown intrusions by detecting deviations from normal behaviors. It creates a profile from normal behaviors and then any activities that deviated from this profile are treated as a possible intrusion. Many data mining algorithms already been used for anomaly detection such as decision tree (DT), naïve Bayesian (NB), neural networks (NN), support vector machines (SVM), and Principal Components Analysis (PCA) etc. The major drawback of anomaly-based IDS is to provide a large number of false positives.
Related Work
Intrusion detection was first introduced by James P. Anderson in 1980 by introducing a threat classification model that develops a security monitoring surveillance system based on detecting anomalies in user behaviors [24] . Later in 1987, Dr. Denning proposed several models for IDS based on statistics, Markov chains, time-series, etc [25] . In 1988, a statistical anomaly-based IDS was proposed by Haystack [26] , which used both user and group-based anomaly detection strategies. In 2005, Fan et al. proposed a method that injects artificial anomaly data into the training data to detect known and unknown intrusions, which help a baseline classifier to distinguish between normal and anomalous data [27] . In 2006, Bouzida et al. applied decision tree (DT) for anomaly-based intrusion detection, which assigns a default class to the test instance that is not covered by the tree and then the default class are examined for unknown attack analysis [28] . In 2004, Peddabachigari et al. [29] applied decision tree (DT) and support vector machine (SVM) for intrusion detection, which proved that DT is better than SVM in terms of overall accuracy. Particularly, DT much better in detecting user to root (U2R) and remote to local (R2L) network attacks, compared to SVM. In 2001, Barbara et al. [30] proposed a method for detecting new attacks and reducing false positives, which estimates the probability using Bayes estimators to enhance the ability of ADAM based IDS [31] . In 2004, Amor et al. performed an experimental analysis to compare the performance between NB classifier and DT classifier by employing KDD99 dataset, and the result proved that NB classifier is 7 times faster than DT with respect to running time, and DT outperforms in classifying normal, denial of service (DoS), and remote to local (R2L) attacks, whereas NB classifier is superior in classifying Probing and user to root (U2R) attacks [32] . In 2007, Panda and Patra [33] proposed a method using naïve Bayes to detect signatures of specific attacks. They used KDD99 dataset for experiment, and the authors give a conclusion that NB classifier performs back propagation neural network classifier in terms of detection rates and false positives. It is also reported that NB classifier produces a relatively high false positive. Later in 2009, the same authors Panda and Patra [34] compares NB classifier with 5 other similar classifiers, i.e., JRip, Ridor, NNge, Decision Table, and Hybrid Decision Table, and experimental results shows that the NB classifier is better than other classifiers.
Data Mining for Intrusion Detection
As current intrusion detection systems (IDS) have many limitations, the data mining for intrusion detection open a new research area in intelligent computing. Data mining algorithms can be used for misuse detection and anomaly detection. In misuse detection, the training data are labeled as either "normal" or "intrusion," and then a classifier detect the known intrusions. Anomaly detection builds models of normal behavior and automatically detects significant deviations from it. Fig 1 shows the architecture of data mining based IDS.
Data mining based IDS collects audit data or network logs from computer system or network, and then applies intelligent methods to extract hidden intrusion patterns from the data. It first collects the audit data from the network using multiple sensors, and stores the audit data for future reference. Training and testing datasets are generated from the collected audit data.
Data processing and cleaning is the process of removing noise and inconsistent data from dataset and formatted the dataset that is suitable for mining. Intrusion detecting dataset may contain hundreds of input attributes, and many of which may be irrelevant to the mining task or redundant, because the information they added is contained in other attribute. Input attribute selection reduces the dataset size by removing irrelevant or redundant attributes. The use of all attributes may simply increase the overall complexity of detection model, increase computational time, and decrease the detection accuracy of the intrusion detection algorithms. It has been tested that effective attributes selection improves the detection rates for different types of network intrusions in intrusion detection. After attribute selection the data mining algorithm is trained by the examples from the training dataset and then classifies the examples of testing dataset. When the rules are generated then the model classifies the real time network data and notifies intrusion prevention system (IPS) or security administrator about the intrusions in the network. IPS or security administrator carries out the prescriptions controlled by the IDS.
LEARNING ALGORITHMS 3.1 Boosting
Boosting is an iterative process, which adaptively changes the distribution of training examples so that the base classifiers will focus on examples that are hard to classify. The concept of adaptive boosting called AdaBoost algorithm was first introduced by Freund and Schapire in 1997 [35] that classify an example by voting the weighted predictions of a set of base classifiers, which are generated in a series of rounds. The major drawback of boosting is overfitting; that is, with many rounds of boosting, the test error increase as the final classifier becomes overly complex. Boosting have become one of the alternative framework for classifier design, together with the more established classifiers, like Bayesian classifier, decision tree, neural network, and support vector machine. Boosting assigns a weight to each training example and adaptively changes the weight at the end of each boosting round. A sample is drawn according to the sampling distribution of the training examples to obtain a new training dataset. Next, a classifier is induced from the training dataset and used to classify all the examples in the original dataset. The weights of the training examples are updated at the end of each boosting round. Examples that are misclassified will have their weights increased, while those that are correctly classified will have their weight decreased. This forces the classifier to focus on examples that are difficult to classify in subsequent iterations.
Naïve Bayesian Classifier
Naïve Bayesian classifier is a simple classification scheme, which estimates the class-conditional probability by assuming that the attributes are conditionally independent, given the class label c. The conditional independence assumption can be formally stated as follows:
Where each attribute set A = {A 1 ,A 2 ,….,A n }consists of n attribute values. With the conditional independence assumption, instead of computing the class-conditional probability for every 
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) or Security
Administrator combination of A, only estimate the conditional probability of each A i , given C. The latter approach is more practical because it does not require a very large training set to obtain a good estimate of the probability. To classify a test example, the naïve Bayesian classifier computes the posterior probability for each class C.
Since P(A) is fixed for every A, it is sufficient to choose the class that maximizes the numerator term,
The naïve Bayesian classifier has several advantages. It is easy to use, and unlike other classification approaches, only one scan of the training data is required. The naïve Bayesian classifier can easily handle missing attribute values by simply omitting the probability when calculating the likelihoods of membership in each class. The NB classifier is straightforward to use, where there are simple relationships, it often does yield good results.
Proposed Leaning Algorithm
Given a training data D = {t 1 ,…,t n }, where t i = {t i1 ,…,t ih } and the attributes {A 1 , A 2 ,…,A n }. Each attribute A i contains the following attribute values {A i1 , A i2 ,…,A ih }. The training data D also contains a set of classes C = {C 1 , C 2 ,…,C m }. Each training example has a particular class C j . The algorithm first initializes the weights of training examples to an equal value of w i =1/n, where n is the total number of training examples in D. Then the algorithm generates a new dataset D i with equal number of examples from training data D using selection with replacement technique and calculates the prior P(C j ) and class conditional P(A ij |C j ) probabilities for new dataset D i .
The prior probability P(C j ) for each class is estimated by counting how often each class occurs in the dataset D i . For each attribute A i the number of occurrences of each attribute value A ij can be counted to determine P(A i ). Similarly, the class conditional probability P(A ij |C j ) for each attribute values A ij can be estimated by counting how often each attribute value occurs in the class in the dataset D i . Then the algorithm classifies all the training examples in training data D with these prior P(C j ) and class conditional P(A ij |C j ) probabilities from dataset D i . For classifying the examples, the prior and conditional probabilities are used to make the prediction. This is done by combining the effects of the different attribute values from that example. Suppose the example e i has independent attribute values {A i1 , A i2 ,…,A ip }, we know P(A ik | C j ), for each class C j and attribute A ik . We then estimate P(e i | C j ) by
To classify the example, the probability that e i is in a class is the product of the conditional probabilities for each attribute value with prior probability for that class. The posterior probability P(C j | e i ) is then found for each class and the example classifies with the highest posterior probability value for that example.
The algorithm classifies each example t i D with maximum posterior probability. After that the weights of the training examples t i in training data D are adjusted/ updated according to how they were classified. If an example was misclassified then its weight is increased, or if an example was correctly classified then its weight is decreased.
To updates the weights of training data D, the algorithm computes the misclassification rate, the sum of the weights of each of the training example t i D that were misclassified. That is, P(e i | C j ) = P(C j ) ∏ k=1→p P(A ij | C j )
6. Updates the weights of each training examples t i D, according to how they were classified. If an example was misclassified then its weight is increased, or if an example was correctly classified then its weight is decreased. To updates the weights of training examples the misclassification rate is calculated, the sum of the weights of each of the training example t i D that were misclassified:
Where err ( t i ) is the misclassification error of example t i. If the example t i was misclassified, then is err ( t i ) 1. Otherwise, it is 0. If a training example was correctly classified, its weight is multiplied by error (M i )/(1-error(M i )). Once the weights of all of the correctly classified examples are updated, the weights for all examples including the misclassified examples are normalized so that their sum remains the same as it was before. To normalize a weight, the algorithm multiplies the weight by the sum of the old weights, divided by the sum of the new weights. As a result, the weights of misclassified examples are increased and the weights of correctly classified examples are decreased. 
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
The performance of intrusion detection systems (IDS) are estimated by detection rates (DR) and false positives (FP). DR is defined as the number of intrusion instances detected by the system divided by the total number of intrusion instances present in the dataset. DR = 100 * _ _ det _ attacks Total attacks ected Total (6) FP is defined as the total number of normal instances. 
KDD99 Intrusion Detection Dataset
The access of intrusion detection dataset is strictly limited and cannot be shared in public domain, because the network data generated by IDS contain information about network topology, hosts and other confidential information's. The KDD 1999 cup benchmark intrusion detection dataset was used in the 3 rd International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition to evaluate the performance of various intrusion detection methods [36] . In 1998, DARPA intrusion detection evaluation program, a simulated environment was set up to acquire raw TCP/IP dump data for a local-area network (LAN) by the MIT Lincoln Lab. It was operated like a real environment, but being blasted with multiple intrusion attacks and received much attention in the research community of adaptive intrusion detection. The KDD99 dataset contest uses a version of DARPA98 dataset. In KDD99 dataset, each example represents attribute values of a class in the network data flow, and each class is labeled either normal or attack.
The classes in KDD99 dataset can be categorized into five main classes: one normal class and four attack classes: probe, DOS, U2R, and R2L. Normal connections are the daily normal user behaviors. Denial of Service (DoS) attack causes the computing power or memory of a victim machine too busy or too full to handle legitimate requests. Remote to User (R2L) is an attack that a remote user gains access of a local user by sending packets to a machine over a network communication. User to Root (U2R) is an attack that an intruder begins with the access of a normal user account and then becomes a root-user by exploiting various vulnerabilities of the system. Probing (Probe) is an attack that scans a network to gather information or find known vulnerabilities. These four attacks are divided into 22 different attacks.
There are total 41 attributes in KDD99 dataset for each network connection that have either discrete or continuous values and divided into three groups. The first group of attributes is the basic features of network connection, which include the duration, prototype, service, number of bytes from source IP addresses or from destination IP addresses, and some flags in TCP connections. The second group of attributes in KDD99 is composed of the content features of network connections and the third group is composed of the statistical features that are computed either by a time window or a window of certain kind of connections. Table 1 show the number of examples in 10% training and testing data of KDD99 dataset. 
Experimental Results
The experiments were performed by using an Intel Core 2 Duo Processor 2.0 GHz processor (2 MB Cache, 800 MHz FSB) with 1 GB of RAM. We tested the intrusion detection performance of the proposed learning algorithm with k-Nearest-Neighbor classifier (kNN), Decision Tree classifier (C4.5), Support Vector Machines (SVM), Neural Network (NN), and Genetic Algorithm (GA) by employing on the KDD99 benchmark intrusion detection dataset that is tabulated in Table 2 [37]- [40] . It has been successfully tested that effective attributes selection improves the detection rates for different types of network intrusions in intrusion detection. The performance of proposed algorithm on 12 attributes in KDD99 dataset is listed in Table 3 . 
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we introduce a new algorithm for adaptive intrusion detection based on boosting and naïve Bayesian classifier, which is an ensemble approach of boosting for improving the detection rates with low false positives in intrusion detection. The main propose of this paper is to improve the performance of naïve Bayesian classifier in intrusion detection. The naïve Bayesian classifier is popular data mining algorithm for classification problem that has several advantages such as it is easy to use and only one scan of training data is required. It can also easily handle the missing values by simply omitting the probability when calculating the likelihoods of membership in each class. We tested the performance of proposed algorithm with existing data mining algorithms and the experimental results manifest that the proposed algorithm achieved high detection rates and reduced the percentage of false positives for different types of network intrusions. The future works focus on applying other mining algorithms with this boosting approach for improving the detection rates in intrusion detection and also apply this algorithm in real world problem domain of intrusion detection. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

